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Abstract
We develop a dynamic network model whose links are governed by banks’ optmizing
decisions and by an endogenous t￿tonnement market adjustment. Banks in our model
can default and engage in ￿resales: risk is trasmitted through direct and cascading
counterparty defaults as well as through indirect pecuniary externalities triggered by
￿resales. We use the model to assess the evolution of the network con￿guration un-
der various prudential policy regimes, to measure banks’ contribution to systemic risk
(through Shapley values) in response to shocks and to analyze the e￿ects of systemic
risk charges. We complement the analysis by introducing the possibility of central bank
liquidity provision.
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11 Introduction
Interconnections in the banking system, as fostered by fast developments in ￿nancial inno-
vation, increased degree of complexity in modern ￿nancial systems and the di￿usion of over
the counter derivatives, made systemic risk endemic and epidemic at crises times. Intercon-
nections, initially set-up to facilitate risk sharing, have created channels whereby ￿nancial
distress is quickly spread onto the entire system. Not surprisingly the rationale behind gov-
ernment intervention and bank bail out programs in the aftermath of the recent ￿nancial
crisis was to be found not in the too-big-to-fail argument but in the too-interconnected-to-
fail argument. The dangers associated with highly interconnected systems come from the
possibility that the ￿nancial distress, experienced by one bank, might turn through cas-
cading e￿ects into full-￿edged systemic risk, whose monitoring, assessment and prevention
has become paramount. Indeed one of the most important legacies of the 2007-2008 crisis
has been the creation and development of a number of institutions whose mission is that of
measuring systemic risk, monitoring ￿nancial vulnerabilities and safeguarding the ￿nancial
system.1
Against this background the literature o￿ered no concrete paradigm to account for net-
work externalities in combination with micro-founded decisional rules and ￿nancial (mis)-
incentives, to quantify systemic risk and to forecast the development of ￿nancial contagion.
We do a step in that direction by constructing a dynamic network model with heterogenous
and micro-founded banks, whose links emerge endogenously from the interaction of interme-
diaries’ optimizing decisions and an iterative t￿tonnement process which determines market
prices. The ￿nancial system featured by our model consists of a network with a ￿nite number
1In the U.S. the Dodd￿Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (See Financial Stability
Oversight Council [19]) had created the Financial Stability Oversight Council, whose statute states in Title
1 that the primary objective of this institute is that of monitoring systemic risk. The main mission of the
European Systemic Risk Board, established 16 December 2010, is the prevention or mitigation of systemic
risks to ￿nancial stability in the Union that arise from developments within the ￿nancial system. The
Financial Stability Board (FSB) has been established to coordinate, at the international level, the work of
national ￿nancial authorities in addressing vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regulatory
and supervisory policies.
2of ￿nancial institutions which solve an optimal portfolio allocation taking into account liq-
uidity and capital constraints. Banks hold di￿erent amounts of equity capital and di￿er for
the returns on non-liquid assets due to di￿erent information and administrative cost. Such
di￿erences in returns gives rise to heterogenous optimal portfolio allocation on banks assets
and remainder liabilities, hence to excess demand or supply of bank borrowing and lending.
Banks’ links are given by lending and borrowing that takes place in the interbank market.
A crucial feature of our model is that the links in the adjacency matrix characterizing the
network are not assigned randomly as in random network models but emerge endogenously
from the combination of the optimal banks’ decision. Furthermore dynamic adjustment in
our model emerges as an intrinsic feature of the market adjustment even in absence of an
initial shock impulse. Network externalities thus emerge as a manifestation of individual
optimizing behavior and market adjustment. Since non-liquid assets are marked-to-market,
the model also features pecuniary externalities via the occurrence of ￿re-sales.
Contagion manifests itself through direct and indirect e￿ects. The direct e￿ects comprise
common exposure to risky assets and local network externalities. First, if banks invest in the
same ￿nancial products their balance sheets are correlated due to the multinomial nature of
the shocks. Second, as banks are interlinked through counterparty exposure in the interbank
market, a defaulting bank transmits losses to creditor banks. The cascading sequences of
defaults e￿ectively constitute an endogenous risk propagation mechanism. Indirect contagion
e￿ects manifest through ￿re-sales (pecuniary externalities ). A negative shock in the value
of non-liquid assets induces several banks to de-leverage in order to satisfy their capital and
liquidity requirements: this is a credit event that produces a fall in the market price and a
cascade of losses in marked-to-market balance sheet of all other banks.
We use our model to evaluate the e￿ects of credit events on the con￿guration of the
network, to asses the role of a number of prudential policies and to quantify systemic risk.
To this purpose we simulate our model, using a sequential clearing algorithm 2, in response to
2Our algorithm is a￿ne to the clearing algorithms implemented in presence of sequential defaults as
in Eisenberg and Noe [16]. The algorithm is consistent with general properties on clearing vector such as
3adverse shocks to non-liquid assets, interpreted as a credit event, and analyze the evolution
of the banking network. Using Shapley values 3 we compute the contribution of each bank
to systemic risk, de￿ned as the aggregate sum of imputed asset losses under sequential
default over total asset in the banking system. The contribution of each bank to systemic
risk crucially depends upon the bank’s position in the network: a large over-leveraged bank
linked to many other lenders can more likely contaminate the system when subject to shocks
to its non-liquid assets.
We analyze overall systemic risk and the contribution of each bank to it under dif-
ferent parameter con￿gurations for various prudential policies. In this respect our paper
contributes to the discussion on the role of prudential regulation in taming systemic risk
in ￿nancial systems. Prudential policies are investigated along two lines: ￿rst of all, liq-
uidity requirements, changes in the capital requirement, and changes in asset risk weights
are considered. These policies all directly a￿ect the constraints in banks’ portfolio optimiza-
tion. Second, we investigate systemic risk charges as introduced, for example, in Germany in
2011,4 which a￿ect banks’ objective function in banks’ portfolio optimization. In the spirit
of a Pigouvian tax, these risk charges on a bank’s derivative investments and interconnect-
edness shall give incentives to ￿nancial institutions to lower their contribution to systemic
risk.
Generally speaking changes in policy and regulations a￿ect the strength of the cascade
in response to shocks and the extent of both, the network and pecuniary externalities.
We ￿nd for instance that an increase in the capital requirement, as well as an increase
in the risk weights, induce a bell shaped dynamic of overall systemic risk. At low levels
of capital requirements, for instance, banks endowed with high return investment tend to
leverage up, therefore increasing the demand for liquidity. The ensuing increase in the
lending rates in the interbank market induces banks, featuring low returns on non-liquid
proportional repayment under default and limited liability.
3See Bluhm and Krahnen [27] and Borio, C., N. Tarashev and K. Tsatsaronis [11].
4See www.dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/034/1703407.pdf for an outline of the German risk charge
(access on 10 November 2012).
4assets, to invest in interbank lending due asset substitution. The market then clusters the
connections around the high leveraged banks, which end up contributing heavily to systemic
risk. As the requirement raises (say beyond 0.1), the capital constraint becomes binding
and banks start to hoard liquidity: the banking network becomes sparse and systemic risk
decreases. Increases in liquidity requirement instead tend to decrease overall systemic risk
monotonically: higher liquidity requirements force all banks to retain bu￿er savings. As a
result the size of each inter-connection (as captured by the amount of money lent/borrowed
for each pair of banks) decreases and robustness tends to prevail on fragility making the
network becomes safer. At last risk charges, namely taxes on non-liquid asset returns and
on interbank lending returns, lead to a decrease in systemic risk and banks’ contribution
to it: banks’ incentives to participate to the interbank market decrease and so do banks’
interconnections. The downside of this is that the overall investment in non-liquid asset
decreases due to limited availability of liquidity and to expropriation of non-liquid asset
returns due to taxation.
All our experiments are also repeated in the case in which a central bank intervenes
by providing liquidity in the interbank market: overall the presence of the central banks
improves liquidity provision, hence investment prospects, and reduces the extent of interbank
inter-connections, as bank need to rely less on market funds.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 compares our model to the
recent literature on systemic risk. Section 3 describes the model, the equilibrium formation
process, the shock transmission and the measure of systemic risk. Section 4 describes the
numerical results and analyzes the policy designs. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
This paper is related to di￿erent strands of the literature. It is related to the literature
on economic networks, it contributes to the literature on market mechanisms and to an
emerging literature on measurement of systemic risk.
5Over the last decade network models have emerged as an alternative paradigm to ana-
lyze a variety of economic and social problems ranging from the formation of contacts and
links in labour, ￿nancial and product markets to the formation and evolution of research
networks (see Jackson [25]). The recent ￿nancial crisis has conveyed increased attention
toward models featuring pecuniary and network externalities. The ￿rst model to exploit
network externalities in banking systems is Allen and Gale [3]: banks in their model hold
cross-deposit, whose connections expose banks to contagion. Recently Gai, Haldane and
Kapadia [21] have developed a random network model for the inter-bank market and have
analyzed the e￿ects of complexity and concentration onto ￿nancial fragility. In their model
inter-linkages are driven by Poisson distributions and evolve in response to shocks: their
model therefore belongs to the class of random networks. More recently Elliot, Golub and
Jackson [17] analyze integration and diversi￿cation in payment systems for banks subjects to
default, while Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi [1] analyze the robust-yet-fragile property
of interconnected payment systems. In most of those models payments or ￿nancial transac-
tions are obtained through heuristics or tipping point: relatively to those contributions in
our model network links are the results of micro-founded optimizing banks’ decisions and of
an endogenous market process. Dynamic adjustment in our model results from the endoge-
nous response to shocks of optimizing banks and of the t￿tonnement equilibrium process
characterizing market adjustment. 5 Caballero and Simsek [13] focus on the role of complex-
ity in network models: given the intricate structure of inter-linkages, banks face ambiguity
when trading in the interbank market. This might amplify ￿re-sale when rumors of ￿nancial
vulnerabilities are released. Krahnen and Bluhm [27] analyze the formation of systemic risk,
through Shapley values, in a model with three interconnected banks. In their model tip-
ping points for the di￿usion of systemic risk are determined by exogenously given heuristics,
hence contrary to us they do not analyze optimizing banks decisions. Finally Anand, Gai
and Marsili [6] analyze the e￿ects of rollover risk in a model combining features from the
5See also Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin [14].
6global game theory and from the random networks.
Our model also contributes to the literature on market mechanisms, by analyzing the
quantitative implications of centralized t￿tonnement. Experimental evidence on the e￿ects
of t￿tonnement pricing mechanism is reported in Lugovskyy, Puzzello and Tucker [30] and
Baghestanian [8]. The price convergence process featured in their works is in line with the
one obtained in our model. While our model uses a centralized market mechanism 6, other
models of ￿nancial networks use bilateral trading (see for instance Atkenson, Eisfeldt and
Weill[7] ). The algorithm developed to analyze the t￿tonnement process of our model follows
the traditions of clearing mechanisms that rely on lattice theory, most notably Eisenberg and
Noe [16] who however take the banks’ asset and liability structure as given.
A number of other papers have dealt with the analysis of systemic risk: see for instance
Lagunof and Schreft [28], Rochet and Tirole [33], Freixas, Parigi and Rochet [20], Leitner
[29], Eisenberg and Noe [16], Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pellizon [29], Geanakoplos [22].
Allen and Babus [4] provide an excellent recent survey. Finally our paper is related to the
literature studying the design of regulations aimed at abating systemic risk (see for instance
Allen and Gale [5]).
3 The Model
The ￿nancial system is made up with a population of N banks. Let N 2 f1;::::;ng represent
a ￿nite set of individual banks, each of whom is identi￿ed with a node of the network. We
de￿ne ex-ante for this population a network g 2 G as the set of links among heterogenous
banks N, with G being the set of all possible networks: An arc or a link between two banks i
and j is denoted by gi;j where gi;j 2 R: Here gi;j 6= 0 re￿ects the presence of a link (directed
network), while gi;j = 0 re￿ects the absence of it. Links bear the actual economic meaning
of banks’ cross borrowing and lending. A crucial aspect of our analysis lies in the fact
that those cross investment positions (hence the network links) result endogenously from the
6See also Cifuentes, Ferucci and Shin [14] or Du￿e and Zhu [15] for other centralized mechanisms.
7banks’ optimizing decision and the markets’ t￿tonnement processes. An important dimension
in the di￿usion of risk concerns the number of direct links held by each bank: a loss of value
in the balance sheet of bank i will a￿ect immediately all banks directly connected with bank
i. For this reason it is instructive to de￿ne Nd(i;g) = fk 2 N j gi;k 6= 0g as the set of banks
with whom bank i has a direct link in the network. The cardinality of this set is given
by d
i(g) =
 Nd(i;g)
 , namely the number of banks with whom i is directly linked in the
network g. The n square adjacency matrix G(t) of the network g describes the connections
which arise after (t) iterations of the t￿tonnement process. Given that our model features a
directed weighted network, banks i and j are directly connected if gij 6= 0:
Our network features optimizing banks which undertake an optimal portfolio allocation
by maximizing pro￿ts subject to liquidity and capital requirement constraints and a non zero
non-liquid asset constraint. Banks decide about the optimal amount of liquid assets (cash),
the optimal amount of lending and borrowing in the interbank market, and the optimal
investment in non-liquid assets (bonds or collateralized debt obligations). Network external-
ities materialize through the lending and borrowing taking place in the interbank market,
while pecuniary externalities materialize since non-liquid assets are marked-to-market.
Banks di￿er for their equity endowment and return on non-liquid asset investments,
which results, after optimization has taken place, in heterogenous optimal portfolio alloca-
tions. The optimizing decision together with the dynamic adjustment taking place in asset
and interbank markets determines the ￿nal portfolio allocations and the ￿nal borrowing and
lending positions: the latter represent the entry of the adjacency matrix G characterizing
the interbank network.
The clearing mechanism in our model is achieved through a sequential t￿tonnement
process7 that takes place ￿rst in the interbank market (for given price of non-liquid assets)
and subsequently in the market for non-liquid assets (for given clearing price in the interbank
market). Central walrasian auctioneers receive individual demand and supply of interbank
7See Mas-Colell and Whinston [32], and Mas-Colell [31].
8lending and adjust prices until the distance between aggregate demand and supply has
converged to zero8: the price adjustment in each market is done in ￿ctional time during
which trade does not take place. Once a clearing price has been achieved, actual trade in
the interbank market takes place according to the criterion of the closest matching partner :
more simply banks wishing to borrow are matched with banks wishing to lend the closest
possible amount. This matching mechanism is compatible with pair-wise e￿ciency and is in
line with actual practice. Once equilibrium, both in price and quantities, has been achieved
we can analyze the ￿nal network con￿guration. The latter can however change once the asset
portfolio of one bank is subject to shocks to non-liquid assets: the shock indeed triggers a
new round of t￿tonnement adjustments. The shock is followed by a number of periods in
which sequential defaults trigger banks’ re-optimization and market re-adjustments: those
periods are not ￿ctional ones, but actual trading times.
3.1 Banks’ Optimization
A bank’s balance sheet consists of the elements displayed on Table 1.
Assets Liabilities
Cash (c) Deposits (d)
Bank lendings (bl) Bank borrowings (bb)
Non-liquid assets (nla) Equity (e)
Table 1: Banks’ Balance Sheets
We use the index i to indicate each individual bank, which can be either a borrower or a
lender, we use the index j to indicate the trading partner of each bank. Banks’ optimization
problem is detailed as follows. Bank i’s objective function is given by:
E(
i) = bl
i  r
rf +
ri;nla
p
 nla
i   bb
i  r
rf 
1
1   PDi; (1)
8The convex banks’ optimization problem guarantees that individual and aggregate excess demands
behave according to Liapunov convergence.
9where  denotes pro￿t, bli =
PN
j=1 bli;j is bank i’s lending vis a vis all counterparts,
bbi =
PN
j=1 bbi;j is bank i lending vis-￿-vis all counterparts, rrf, is the risk-free interest rate on
the interbank market which will later on be determined through the centralized t￿tonnement
process, p is the market price of the non-liquid asset, later determined through the centralized
t￿tonnement process in the market for non-liquid assets, ri;nla is the return on non-liquid
assets, which is bank speci￿c and set exogenously according to a uniform distribution and
 is the loss-given-default ratio. The latter parameter captures the fact that only a fraction
of the outstanding amount is paid back in case of the debtor’s default. Two considerations
are in order. First, notice that while non-liquid assets are traded at a single centralized
price, whose changes trigger ￿re sale externalities on banks’ asset portfolios, the return on
bank borrowing features two components, a central clearing price, rrf; common to all banks
and an additional risk premium, 1
1 PDi; which is bank speci￿c. The latter is determined
based on expectations of individual banks’ default probabilities, which are obtained through
a least square iterative process, as detailed in section 3.2. This assumption captures the
idea that bank borrowing typically features heterogenous prices linked to individual bank’s
health. Second, the pro￿t function takes into account the fact that in every period a fraction
of banks might default on repayment. The possibility of sequential default is also the reason
for which the return on bank lending does not include the premium: each lending bank
charges premia to di￿erent counterparts; ex post however some counterparts default and the
return on bank lending is set to satisfy arbitrage on risky assets. A detailed derivation of
Equation (1) that takes into account this mechanism can be found in Appendix A.
Banks face a liquidity constraint, of the type envisaged in Basel III agreements, due to
which they have to hold at least a percentage, ; of their deposits in cash:9
c
i    d (2)
Furthermore banks face a capital requirement constraint, as they must maintain an
9For simplicity this fraction is assumed constant.
10equity ratio, eri; of at least 
 + :
er
i =
ci + pnla  nlai + bli   di   bbi
1  pnla  nlai + 2bli  
 +  (3)
where 1 and 2 are risk weights assigned respectively to the two risky assets, namely
non-liquid investment and bank lending. The parameter 
 identi￿es the regulatory require-
ment, while the parameter  re￿ects banks preference for capital bu￿er. The risk coe￿cients
are set exogenously as part of the regulatory system. Realistically we assume that banks need
to hold less capital for bank lending than for investments in non-liquid assets, i.e. 1  2.
If banks’ equity ratio, eri; is lower than the minimum capital requirement, 
; banks can
reduce their exposure into bank lending (or in non-liquid assets): e￿ectively this results in a
reduction of the denominator of equation 3, relatively to the numerator, until the required
ratio is achieved. This implies for instance, as we shall see later on, that any change in the
regulatory capital requirement, 
; will result in a change of the demand (or supply) of bank
lending in the interbank market, hence in a change of the cross-exposure of the network.
Changes in the regulatory levels of the risk weights parameter 1 and 2 will also trigger an
adjustment in the interbank and non-liquid asset markets. The higher are those weights, the
larger is the extent to which banks have to re-adjust their non-liquid asset and bank lending
positions in order to satisfy the capital requirement. As losses materialize due to cascading
counterpart lack of repayments, banks will sell non-liquid assets to rebalance portfolios and
meet capital requirements. Banks which cannot ful￿ll regulatory requirements default.
Three further observations are worth noticing. First, note that liquid assets do not
appear in the denominator of equation 3; this is so since banks do not have to hold capital
for their liquid asset holdings. Second, similar to [14] non-liquid assets are marked to market,
which gives the potential for ￿re-sale spirals in the model: as the price of non-liquid assets
falls due to ￿re sales, the asset values of all banks investing in non-liquid assets falls. Third,
banks face a no-short sales constraint :
nla
i  0: (4)
11The latter is needed for the problem to be well-behaved: this indeed rules out the
possibility of negative prices for non-liquid assets.
Individual banks’ constrained optimal solution to their pro￿t function which determines
their optimal asset and liability allocations is found via maximizing Equation 1 subject to
constraints 2, 3, and 4, using linear programming techniques. We also add four further
constraints which make sure the solution is feasible. Due to the linear nature of both the
objective and the constraints in the portfolio optimization problem and according to the
Duality Theorem of Linear Programing we can reformulate the maximization problem as a
minimization problem for the i bank subject to smaller equal constraints. The new con-
strained minimization optimal problem reads as follows:
minbli;bbi;nlai;ci   E(
i) =  nla
i 
ri;nla
p
  bl
i  r
rf + bb
i  r
rf 
1
1   PDi
s.t.
 c
i     d
 c
i   nla
i(P(1   (
 + )1))   bl
i(1   (
 + )2) + bb
i   d
i
nla
i  0;c
i  0;bb
i  0;bl
i  0;c
i + nla
iP + bl
i   bb
i = d
i + e
i
The next section describes the sequential t￿tonnement processes, and the respective
clearing mechanisms, taking place ￿rst in the interbank market (for given price of non-liquid
asset) and then in the market for non-liquid assets.
3.2 Equilibrium in the Interbank Market: T￿tonnement and Clear-
ing Mechanism
The equilibrium allocation on the interbank market is found in two steps. The ￿rst step
consists of ￿nding the market clearing interest rates as well as the aggregate supply/demand
of interbank funds. The second step consist in ￿nding the allocation of interbank funds
12supplied in equilibrium, which then determines the structure of interlinkages between lending
and borrowing banks.
The market clearing rates rrf + rPDi are found via a discrete t￿tonnement process as
follows. Given a set of parameters, 10 including rrf and rPDi, banks optimize their portfolio
via maximizing Equation (1) subject to the set of regulatory constraints (Equations (2) to
(4)). Banks submit their optimal demand and supply of funds to an auctioneer, which then
sums them up to obtain the aggregate excess demand or supply in the market and to adjust
the price accordingly. The interbank centralized rate, rrf, is increased if F supply < F demand
and decreased in the opposite case, where F supply and F demand are the overall amounts of
funds supplied and demanded, respectively. The rates are adjusted in a ￿ctional time until
equilibrium is achieved and actual trade takes place.
The exact implementation of the t￿tonnement process is as follows. At time zero, there
are three reference points: an upper interest bound, r
rf
0 , a lower interest bound, r
rf
0 , and the
actual risk-free rate, r
rf
0 . It is assumed that r
rf
0  r
rf
0  r
rf
0 . Given those bounds and banks’
initial optimal portfolio allocation there might be excess demand or supply on the interbank
market. To ￿x ideas let’s assume that it results in an excess supply of bank lending. In this
case the lending rate adjusts downwards to re-equilibrate bank lending. The new lending
rate is set to r
rf
1 =
r
rf
0 +rrf
2 and the new upper bound is set to r
rf
1 = r
rf
0 . Given the new
lending rates banks re-optimize their portfolio allocation, which then results in new bank
lending positions. Gradually, the excess supply of bank lending is absorbed through this
sequential adjustment of the lending rate. The opposite adjustment takes place if demand
for liquidity exceeds supply. The process converges when the interest rate adjustment is
below a tolerance value $.
Once equilibrium amounts of funds exchanged on the interbank market have been ob-
tained, it remains to determine the actual allocation of funds across banks, namely the
10This set of parameters includes speci￿c values for all regulatory requirements, in particular for 
 (capital
requirement ratio), 1 and 2 (risk weights on interbank assets and non-liquid assets),  (the liquidity ratio
requirement); and banks capital endowment, in particular d (amount of deposits bank start with), and ei
(banks equity endowment).
13interlinkages in the interbank market. Notice that banks are indi￿erent among di￿erent
counterparts as ex post they can charge di￿erent risk premia based on individual banks’
default risk An e￿cient allocation is then achieved simply by identifying the closest match-
ing partners. Closest matching partners are lender-creditor pairs of banks which, within a
speci￿ed set, feature the smallest distance between funds demand and supply. Consider for
instance the following example: at market clearing prices the system consists of 4 banks
wishing to lend and 2 banks wishing to borrow. Upon ordering of the respective demand
and supply vectors, we can immediately identify two matching partners: two banks that
demand money and the two banks which provide the largest amounts of funds. For each of
those matching partners, the amount given by the minimum between demand and supply is
exchanged. Given these transactions, two banks have satis￿ed their desired fund allocation
and therefore become inactive: the matching process continues by sorting demand and sup-
ply vectors for the remaining banks until all transactions have been concluded. Note that
the equilibrium set up of a ￿nancial system outlined in this sub-section is obtained for given
individual probabilities of default. However, the probabilities of default which banks have
assumed in their portfolio optimization might di￿er from actual probabilities of default in the
￿nancial system which emerges. The next sub-section outlines how equilibrium probabilities
of default are determined in our model.
3.2.1 Equilibrium probabilities of default
Beyond the recovery rate, ; which we assume to be a common parameter across banks 11,
in our model banks’ equilibrium probabilities of default, PDi, are derived endogenously via
an iterative algorithm. We assume that agents form beliefs relatively to each bank’s default
probability by learning over time from the equilibrium of the ￿nancial systems subject to
repeated shocks. As agents learn the adjacency matrix describing the systems reaches a
stable con￿guration compatible with the limiting distribution for the vector of the default
probabilities. Note that all agents share the same beliefs, that is, banks probabilities of
11Following Grunert and Weber [23] this parameter is set to 0.75.
14default are common knowledge.
Banks’ default probabilities are initially set to zero. First, for a given set of model
parameters, a ￿nancial system forms as outlined in the previous sub-section, based on banks’
individual portfolio choices, the t￿tonnement process, and the interbank market allocation.
Second, this speci￿c ￿nancial system is then exposed to a large number of shocks. 12 Third,
bank i’s conditional probability of default is computed as the fraction of defaults of that
bank in all shock scenarios. By the law of large numbers this percentage can be used to
approximate the probability of default of bank i. These updated probabilities are then used
as guesses for the default probabilities in computing a new ￿nancial system, that is, the ￿rst
step outlined above is repeated.
This iterative procedure is repeated until we detect a ￿nancial system cycle. A ￿nancial
system cycle is detected when the adjacency matrix describing the network of interlinkages
becomes recurrent or equivalently when all banks in the system repeatedly choose the same
portfolio allocation.13
3.3 Equilibrium in the Market for Non-Liquid Assets: Iterative
Procedure
In the model, the market price of the non-liquid asset is found via a continuous time t￿-
tonnement process. Sales and purchases in non-liquid asset markets are triggered by shocks
that prevent banks from ful￿lling its capital requirements. The bank’s supply (or demand),
si, of non-liquid assets is obtained by solving Equation 3 for the amount of non-liquid assets
that would allow bank i to ful￿ll the capital requirements. Since each si is decreasing in p,
the aggregate sales function, S(p) =
P
i
si(p), is also decreasing in p: An equilibrium price
is such that total excess demand equal supplies, namely S(p) = D(p): The price at which
12We set this number being 1000. Each shock is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. Mean
and variance are set to two and four, respectively. Correlation is assumed to be zero. The moments of
distribution are chosen so as to rule out large tail events.
13When a cycle is detected, the probabilities of default are calculated as the average probabilities of
default over a cycle, assuming that banks assign the same probability to each ￿nancial system in a given
cycle.
15total aggregate sales are zero, namely p = 1 can certainly be considered one equilibrium
price. We can de￿ne an aggregate demand function  : [p;1] ! [p;1]: given this function
an equilibrium price solves the following ￿xed point:
(p) = d
 1(s(p)) (5)
The price convergence process in this case is guaranteed by using the following inverse
demand function:14:
p = exp( 
X
i
si); (6)
where  is a positive constant to scale the price responsiveness with respect to non-liquid
assets sold, and si is the amount of bank i’s non-liquid assets sold on the market. Integrating
back the demand function in 6 yields the following:
dp
dt
= S(p) (7)
which states that prices will go up in presence of excess demand and downward in pres-
ence of excess supply. In the above di￿erential equation  represents the rate of adjustment
of prices along the dynamic trajectory.
T￿tonnement on the market for non-liquid assets can be described by the following
iterative process. Prior to any shock, the market price for non-liquid assets equals 1, which
is the initial price when all banks ful￿ll their regulatory requirements, and sales of the non-
liquid asset are zero. A shock to bank i, say a certain loss of assets, shifts the supply curve
upwards, resulting in S(1) = si  0 because bank i starts selling non-liquid assets to ful￿ll
its capital ratio. However, for S(1) the bid price, given by the inverse demand function,
Equation (6), equals only p(S(1))bid, while the o￿er price is one. The resulting market price
is p(S(1))mid, the price in the middle between bid and o￿er prices. Since the market price
thus decreases and banks have to mark their non-liquid assets to market, additional non-
liquid asset sales may be needed to ful￿ll the capital requirement. The step-wise adjustment
14See also Following Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin [14].
16process continues until the demand and the supply curves intersect at p. Note that the
supply curve may become horizontal from some value of non-liquid assets sold onwards, as
the total amount of non-liquid assets on the banks’ balance sheets is limited. Since a shock
to a bank will always result in an upward shift of the supply curve, and the maximum price
of the non-liquid asset equals 1, while the initial equilibrium prior to the shock equals zero, a
market price p 2 (0;1) always exists. The t￿tonnement process on the market for non-liquid
assets is displayed on ￿gure 1.
Figure 1: T￿tonnement Process on the Market for non-liquid Assets
3.4 Systemic Risk Measure
Generally speaking systemic risk occurs in the event in which a shock to one or several
institutions spreads to the system in a way that determines the collapse of a large part
or the entire system. A prerequisite for the emergence of systemic risk is the presence
17of inter-linkages and interdependencies in the market, so that the default (or a run) on
a single intermediary or on a cluster of them leads to a cascade of failures, which could
potentially undermine the functioning of the ￿nancial system. The Financial Stability Board,
International Monetary Fund, and Bank for International Settlements [18] de￿ne systemic
risk as ￿disruption to ￿nancial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts
of the ￿nancial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for
the real economy.￿ Following this de￿nition, systemic risk is the risk that large parts of the
￿nancial system default leading to negative repercussions on the real economy because of a
subsequent lack of ￿nancial services provision and credit. In our paper we de￿ne systemic
risk as the proportion of the ￿nancial system in default subsequent to a shock which hit
the returns to banks’ assets. As explained above a bank defaults when it is unable to meet
regulatory requirements. Recall that banks might default either because they are directly
hit by a shock to their non-liquid asset portfolio which forces them into ￿re sale spirals or
because they have su￿ered losses to their portfolios due to lack of repayment from other
defaulting banks (cascades). Systemic risk is then computed as the ratio of assets from all
defaulting banks subsequent to a shock to non-liquid assets as from equation (8)
 =
P
def assetsdef P
i assetsi
; (8)
where def 2 i indexes banks that are in default after the ￿nancial system has absorbed the
shock.15
Since we are also interested in how much each bank contributes to systemic risk, we
need a metric to measure their impact. While there is much agreement about the general
de￿nition of systemic risk, there is much less agreement upon quantitative measures for in-
dividual contributions. The traditional analysis for measuring contribution to systemic risk
was based upon the judgement of whether the defaulting bank or group of intermediaries
15Note that the amounts of assets used to compute this measure for systemic risk are taken from the
￿nancial system set-up prior to the shock. The reason for this is that the dynamic absorption of the shock
in the ￿nancial system changes the allocation of assets, potentially resulting in banks having no assets at all
when they default.
18was too big to fail: such an assessment is based on indicators such as the institution’s size
relative to the system, market share concentration indices such as the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman
Index, the oligopolistic structure of the market and the presence of barriers to entries. Re-
cently and due to the emergence of complex ￿nancial relations, the focus of contribution to
systemic risk measures has been shifted toward an assessment of the too interconnected to
fail. It is on both concepts that we focus. One measure which has been recently proposed
to determine contribution to systemic risk is the Shapley value. 16 Generally speaking the
Shapley value is a￿ected by banks’ sizes and the degree of bank interconnections. In our
model interconnection occurs through both, direct and indirect links. Direct links are given
by the correlations of shocks to non-liquid assets and the exposure to others’ banks balance
sheets. Indirect links are given by the e￿ects that a fall in the market price of non-liquid
assets has on the balance sheet of the entire system. Note that the overall degree of intercon-
nections in our model is a￿ected by the parameters characterizing the optimizing decision.
The link between size and interconnections with systemic risk implies that any parameter
change which a￿ects these metrics in the network structure will eventually have an impact
on systemic risk as well. In game theory the Shapley value is used to ￿nd the fair allocation
of gains obtained both under cooperative and non-cooperative games. 17 It can be de￿ned
in terms of all possible orders of the players N.18 De￿ne O : 1;:::;n ! 1;:::;n to be a
permutation that assigns to each position k the player O(k). Furthermore denote by (N)
the set of all possible permutations with player set N. Given a permutation O, and denoting
by Prei(O) the set of predecessors of player i in the order O, the Shapley value can be
expressed in the following way:
16See Shapley [34]. See also Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis [11] and Bluhm and Krahnen [27]. Alterna-
tive measures of systemic risks are proposed for instance in Adrian and Brunnermeier [2] through a CoVaR
methodology.
17Gul [24] proves that Shapley values are a good approximation of agents’ payo￿ in e￿cient equilibria
also under non-cooperative games.
18The following exposition draws upon Castro, Gomez, and Tejadab [9] and Stanojevic, Laoutaris, and
Rodriguez [35].
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i(v
	) =
1
N!
X
O2N
 
v
	(Pre
i(O) [ i)   v
	Pre
i((O))

(9)
where v	Prei((O)) is the value obtained in permutation O by the players preceding
player i and v	(Prei(O) [ i) is the value obtained in the same permutation when including
player i. That is, 
i(v	) gives the average marginal contribution of player i over all permu-
tations of player set N. Note that the index 	 denotes di￿erent possible shock scenarios,
that is, banks’ contribution to systemic risk is computed conditional on a shock vector to
the banking system.
Lemma. The Shapley value is characterized by the following properties: a. Pareto
e￿ciency. The total gain of a coalition is distributed. b. Symmetry. Players with equivalent
marginal contributions obtain the same Shapley value. c. Additivity. If one coalition can be
split into two sub-coalitions then the pay-o￿ of each player in the composite game is equal
to the sum of the sub-coalition games. d. Zero player. A player that has no marginal
contribution to any coalition has a Shapley value of zero.
Since the number of permutations involved in calculating the Shapley value increases
strongly with the number of banks, the analysis is subject to the curse of dimensionality. The
Shapley value can then be approximated by the average contribution of banks to systemic
risk over k randomly sampled permutations as displayed in Equation 10:

i(v
	) 
^

i(v
	) =
1
k
X
O2k
 
v
	(Pre
i(O) [ i)   v
	Pre
i((O))

: (10)
Proposition 1. Given that each permutation has the same probability of being sampled
in k; the sample mean
^

i(v	) is an unbiased estimator of the population mean 
i(v	).
20Proof.
E(
^

i(v
	)) = E(
1
k
X
O2k
 
v
	(Pre
i(O) [ i)   v
	Pre
i((O))

)
=
1
k
(k
i(v
	))
= 
i(v
	) (11)
We will investigate systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it using a distribution of
shock scenarios, that is, the shock vector m with dimension (N by 1) is drawn from the
multivariate normal distribution 	  N(;; );with  being the mean vector, while ; 
are respectively the variance and correlation matrix. Given that each draw from 	 has the
same probability of being sampled, the ￿rst two moments of
^

i(v	) can be computed as
^ 
^

i(v	)
i =
1
M
X
m
^

i(v
m2	) (12)
and
^ V ar
^

i(v	)
i =
1
M
X
m
(
^

i(v	)   
i(v
m2	))
2: (13)
In the numerical stress test analysis equations 12 and 13 will be computed with 1000
random draws for k and m. In Appendix B we show, using a Monte Carlo study, that in our
model the approximation becomes precise enough beyond 400 draws.
Given the pareto e￿ciency and additivity properties of the Shapley value, Equation (14)
overall expected systemic risk which can be computed as the sum of all banks’ contribution
to systemic risk as outlined in Equation (12):
^ SR
	
i =
X
i
^ 
^

i(v	)
i : (14)
213.5 Numerical Algorithm
In the model shocks take the form of a loss in banks’ non-liquid asset holdings. 19 If subsequent
to a shock realization, a bank cannot ful￿ll its capital requirement, it will sell non-liquid
assets,20 thereby indirectly transmitting the shock to other banks, via downward pressure
on the market prices of non-liquid assets. If upon re-adjustment the capital requirement is
still non satis￿ed, the bank will default. The clearing algorithm for shock transmission is an
iterative process displayed on Figure 2. 21
Banks’ assets are diminished by the initial shock (step A on Figure 2). Banks that
cannot ful￿ll the capital requirement start selling non-liquid assets in the market (step B on
Figure 2): the market adjustment is modeled via the t￿tonnement process outlined before.
Banks that are not able to ful￿ll the capital requirement even after selling all their non-liquid
assets will eventually default. Insolvent banks with negative equity-value transmit shocks
to their creditors until their equity-value reaches zero. Thus, the overall shock to bank i
creditors is computed as  
P
j aj +pbi+ci 
P
j lj  di in case it defaults (step C on Figure
2): this second round loss constitute in our model an endogenous shock propagation akin
to a cascade. Losses that materialize through the interbank liability channel, are assigned
proportionally to the insolvent bank’s individual liabilities, respecting seniority of deposit
holders (step D on Figure 2). At the end of this process the iteration starts again (step B on
Figure 2). If no further losses materialize via the ￿resales and interbank liability channels,
systemic risk is computed using the Shapley value (step E on Figure 2).
19We follow Bluhm and Krahnen [27] to model the shock transmission process. Other shocks are possible,
for example a sudden drop in non-liquid asset prices or the default of a bank in the system.
20Note that at the shock transmission stage the interbank links are taken as given, that is, banks do not
adjust their lendings and borrowings except for the case of a counterparty default.
21Note that alternatively to our sequential clearing algorithm one can use the Eisenberg and Noe [16]
clearing algorithm used in Cifuentes, Ferruci, and Shin [14]. This latter clearing algorithm can deal with
problems of payment vector indeterminacy in case circular lending relationships between banks exist. Since
in our model banks are either borrowers or lenders, there can be no circular lending relationships in our
model. All following results are qualitatively robust to using the Eisenberg and Noe [16] clearing algorithm
and can be obtained upon request for the latter case.
22Figure 2: Algorithm for Shock Transmission
3.6 Calibration
The model parameters are chosen to match values observed in the ￿nancial system and/or
imposed by supervisory policy. The parameter , the amount of liquid assets banks have
to hold as a function of the amount of deposits, is set to 0:1, thus being equivalent to the
cash reserve ratio in the U.S. The parameter 1, the risk weight for non-liquid assets, is set
to 1: this value re￿ects the risk weight applied in Basel II to commercial bank loans. The
parameter 2, the weight for interbank lending, is set to 0:2; which is also the risk weight
actually applied to interbank deposits between banks in OECD countries. The amount of
equities and deposits that banks have initially on their balance sheets is set to 65 billions
(mean with variance 10) and 600 billions which is the ￿gure actually found on the balance
sheet of the Deutsche Bank in the second quarter of 2012. Following federal reserve bank
regulatory agency de￿nitions, banks must hold a capital ratio of at least 8%. Finally, banks
23return on non-liquid assets is uniformly distributed on the interval between 0% to 15%. The
vector of shocks to the returns on non-liquid assets is drawn from the multivariate normal
distribution 	 with mean 5; variance of 25 and zero covariance. Note that the variance is
set high enough to mimic stress test scenarios. Having a large range is important to capture
the e￿ect of all risk channels, in particular the direct interconnection channel. 22 The model
parameters are displayed on Table 2.
 1 2 
 Deposits & Equity Yield on NLA 	
0.1 1 0.2 0.08 500 0.01 N(65;10) U(0;0:15)  abs(N(mean mean mean;  2;  ))
Table 2: Parameter Values in the Baseline Setting
The table displays the parameter values in the baseline setting.  is banks’ liquidity requirement, 1 is the risk weight for non-liquid asset
investments, 2 is the risk weight for interbank lending, 
 is the capital requirement ratio, & is the amount by which banks overful￿ll regulatory
requirements, and 	 is the multivariate normal distribution of the shocks to the ￿nancial system (note that shocks between banks are uncorrelated,
that is, the covariances between vector elements are zero), with mean mean mean =     5,   2 = diag(    25), and    =      0   diag(    )), where    is an identity
vector of dimension N by 1. N and U designate normal and uniform distributions, respectively.
4 Network Evolution and Shapley Values
In this section we analyze in conjunction the evolution of the network con￿guration as well
as the Shapley value of each bank. First we provide the baseline network con￿guration for
our baseline calibration as from Table 3. Second we analyze the evolution of the network for
di￿erent values of policy parameters: this will provide the basis for evaluating the impact of
di￿erent policy regimes on the degree of inter-connections and on the overall level of invest-
ment in non-liquid assets. Higher inter-connections always imply more liquidity provision,
but also higher degree of risk di￿usion due to endogenous cascading defaults. The baseline
policy experiments will be done by changing the capital and liquidity requirements: the
con￿guration for di￿erent values of the risk factors in the capital requirements are shown in
the technical appendix C. Next, we analyze Shapley values in response to random shocks to
non-liquid assets and for di￿erent parameter con￿guration of the prudential policy regimes.
22See Bluhm and Krahnen [27]
24The numerical analysis is akin to those performed for banks’ stress testing. Our analysis
carries an additional dimension in that we analyze the results under di￿erent policy regimes
and provide a theoretical founded metric of banks’ contribution to systemic risk.
The di￿usion of systemic risk under di￿erent policy regimes will be tightly linked to
the dynamic evolution of the network: a network with strong interconnections, particularly
around highly leveraged or fragile banks, will feature higher level of systemic risk. Banks
highly exposed on the interbank market and prone to defaults will be the main risk spreaders.
In our simulations we will ￿x the number of banks to N = 15: We consider this number
as representative of a mildly concentrated banking system. Changes in several of the policy
parameters (capital and liquidity ratios, risk factors), which implicitly a￿ect the banks’
optimization constraints, will indirectly also provide robustness checks of the results of the
baseline scenarios. To fully assess the role of prudential regulation, with a particular focus
on the current debate over ￿nancial levies 23, we will investigate the impact on the network
and the individual banks’ Shapley values of risk charges, in the form of taxes on interbank
borrowing and investment in non-liquid assets. Both type of taxes can be considered an
approximate of Pigouvian charges as they directly tackle system wide externalities: taxes
on borrowing are aimed at reducing the extent of interconnections and the ensuing network
externalities; taxes on non-liquid investment can instead boost available market liquidity.
Note that all results reported as well as con￿dence intervals given are based on the
outcomes from 1000 multivariate normally distributed random shocks drawn from 	 	 	.
4.1 Alternative Prudential Regulations
At time zero the ￿nancial system is represented by the solution of the model (banks’ optimiza-
tion and market clearings) using baseline parameters outlined on Table 2. The equilibrium
23In Europe there is currently a vivid debate on various forms of ￿nancial taxes, ranging from Pigouvian
type of taxation (linked to risk contribution) to Tobin taxes (aimed at curbing ￿nancial transactions of various
sort). An example is represented by the German Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz, a regulation according to
which banks are charged a levy which depends upon their degree of interconnectedness with other banks and
upon the extent of their derivative investments. The proceeds of these levies are used to ￿nance a resolution
fund to stabilize the ￿nancial system.
25linkages of the time-zero ￿nancial network are displayed on Table 3. The letter B in the
table is used to represent banks, banks’ assets are displayed in the respective rows and banks’
liabilities are displayed in the respective columns. Equilibrium non-liquid (NLA) and liquid
(LA) assets are represented in the last two columns. The last row are liabilities vis-￿-vis
outside investors, namely deposits.
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27Figure 3 displays a visual outline of the ￿nancial system displayed on Table 3. Each
bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball.
The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted
assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets in the ￿nancial system. An arrow
pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the
thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ average equity.
Below each of the stylized ￿nancial system there are four further indicators. First, the
representative red ball provides the basic measurement unit for banks’ size. Second, the
thickness of the representative black line provides the basic measurement unit for the size of
the lending linkage. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate resulting from
the t￿tonnement process in the interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity
(NLA-E) indicates the average (across banks) investment in non-liquid assets relative to
equities.
Recall that banks start with di￿erent returns on non-liquid assets. Banks with relatively
higher returns (banks 4,6,11,12, and 15) will invest more in non-liquid assets, thereby strongly
leveraging in the inter-bank market. Banks with low returns will invest less, while they will
￿nd it more pro￿table to lend in the interbank market: a form of asset substitution kicks in
as for those banks the return on lending is higher than the return on non-liquid investment.
Table 4 displays systemic risk (SR) as well as banks’ contribution to it (B1 - B15)
computed according to equation 12, in the baseline parameter setting. Notice that more
B 1 B 2 B 3 B 4 B 5 B 6 B 7 B 8
0.042 0.001 0.001 0.051 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.040
B 9 B 10 B 11 B 12 B 13 B 14 B 15 SR
0.002 0.002 0.041 0.044 0.002 0.046 0.054 0.469
Table 4: Systemic Risk and Banks’ Contribution in the Baseline Setting Without Central
Bank Intervention
The table displays banks’ contribution to systemic risk computed according to Equation (12), as well as overall systemic risk (SR) computed
according to Equation (14), in the baseline setting. Note that values have been rounded.
leveraged banks do contribute more to systemic risk: when hit by a shock those banks might
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6% of fin. syst.
500% of banks’ equity
Interbank rate: 3.6824%
NLA−E ratio: 797.5772%
Figure 3: Financial System in Baseline Scenario
The ￿gure displays an outline of the ￿nancial system emerging in the baseline setting. Each bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’
identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the
sum of all risk weighted assets in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B,
with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial system there are
four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage of the ￿nancial systems a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the
thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how much lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third,
the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives
an indication about how much banks have invested on average in non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
￿nd themselves unable to repay lending in interbank markets. Therefore they contribute
more in spreading risk through direct links in the interbank market. Moreover and in response
to the shock, those banks would need to sell non-liquid assets to meet the capital requirement.
Thereby they contribute to the fall in the price of non-liquid assets, implicitly triggering a
29reduction in the portfolio values of other banks, thus spreading risk of insolvency indirectly.
30Figure 4 displays selected ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent values for the liquidity
requirements, . By increasing values of the liquidity requirement several e￿ects emerge.
1
2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
14
15
Financial system for  α=0
7% of fin. syst.
332% of banks’ equity
Interbank rate: 3.339%
NLA−E ratio: 874.5003%
1
2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
14
15
Financial system for  α=0.2
6% of fin. syst.
482% of banks’ equity
Interbank rate: 3.784%
NLA−E ratio: 720.6542%
1
2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
14
15
Financial system for  α=0.4
3% of fin. syst.
578% of banks’ equity
Interbank rate: 6.5634%
NLA−E ratio: 566.808%
1
2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
14
15
Financial system for  α=0.6
3% of fin. syst.
425% of banks’ equity
Interbank rate: 7.5712%
NLA−E ratio: 412.9618%
1
2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
14
15
Financial system for  α=0.8
2% of fin. syst.
271% of banks’ equity
Interbank rate: 11.6206%
NLA−E ratio: 259.1157%
1
2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
14
15
Financial system for  α=1
1% of fin. syst.
118% of banks’ equity
Interbank rate: 14.7473%
NLA−E ratio: 105.2695%
Figure 4: Financial System Structures and Liquidity Requirement
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent liquidity requirements, with all remainder model parameters kept
at their baseline value. In each of those realizations a bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The
diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all
banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the
arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators.
First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black
line below gives an indication about how much lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the
equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how
much banks have invested on average in non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
31First, the ￿nancial system becomes more concentrated: the few banks with higher returns
on non-liquid assets invest more (their ball grows). Due to the tighter liquidity requirements
(a larger fraction of deposits has to be kept in cash), they increase the demand for liquidity
in the interbank market. As the demand for liquidity in the interbank market increases,
the equilibrium return on lending raises. This induces banks, with low returns on non-liquid
assets, to engage in interbank lending as a result of asset substitution. Finally, as the fraction
of banks lending increases, the relative amount of overall non-liquid asset investments to
banks’ equity falls.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it for increasing
levels of the liquidity ratio, . The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom
right, computed using equation 14) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis on panels 1 to 15,
computed using equation 12) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the liquidity requirement
ratio. The dotted lines are the two standard deviation error bands, where thresholds are
the 5% cut-o￿ points of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional on the
shock vectors drawn. On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E) ratio, namely
the sum of all interbank lending relative to the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-
dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio, namely the sum of all non-
liquid assets held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity. Several e￿ects emerge.
First, overall systemic risk (panel 16) decreases. Higher liquidity requirements force banks to
invest less in non-liquid assets: this implies less leverage in the interbank market, hence fewer
cascades, and lower probability of ￿re sales. Second, the evolution of the relative amount of
interbank lending is bell-shaped. Initially, as described above, highly leveraged banks replace
their liabilities which they have to hold in cash with interbank lending. This increases the
amount of lending and correspondingly the loan-to-equity ratio. However, as the liquidity
requirement becomes more and more restrictive, supplying banks on the interbank market
have to reduce their supply more and more to meet requirements. This ultimately leads to a
decrease of interbank lending. Notice that the liquidity hoarding in this case also produces
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Figure 5: Systemic Risk and Liquidity Requirement
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis on
panels 1 to 15, computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the liquidity requirement ratio, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. The dotted lines are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points
of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E)
ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity
(NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
a destruction of investment in non-liquid assets. This reduces the extent and the probability
of cascades. As noticed earlier banks’ contribution to systemic risk increases for banks which
invest more and leverage more.
33Next, we turn to investigating the e￿ects of increasing the capital requirement ratio,

. Figure 6 displays the evolution of the ￿nancial network for increasing values of capital
requirement. As the capital requirement increases, all banks are allowed to leverage less:
the e￿ects of di￿erence in the returns for non-liquid assets fades away and as a result banks
acquire similar sizes. The scope for leveraging diminishes also for banks with high returns
on non-liquid assets: as a result overall interbank activity and the equilibrium lending rate
decline. Interestingly and as an e￿ect of asset substitution, the decline in lending rates
induce even less pro￿table banks (with low non-liquid asset returns) to shift by investing
more in non-liquid assets and to provide less liquidity in the interbank markets. Therefore
the system features two counterbalancing e￿ects: when 
 increases, on the one side more
pro￿table banks leverage less and invest less in non-liquid assets, on the other side less
pro￿table banks tend to invest more. Ultimately, at high values of the capital requirement
ratio, banks have less and less scope to invest in non-liquid assets, resulting in a decline of
overall non-liquid investment. Eventually the latter e￿ect prevails and the overall amount of
investment in non-liquid assets (relative to banks’ equity), which is initially constant, falls.
Figure 7 shows the e￿ect of changes in the capital requirement ratio on systemic risk and
banks’ contribution to it. Overall systemic risk has a bell-shaped dynamic: this is due to the
evolution of the two counterbalancing e￿ects described above. For low levels of 
 the extent
of market inter-connections is still large and increasing: this renders the ￿nancial system
more vulnerable as it triggers more cascades in the event of negative shocks. Thereby overall
systemic risk and the contribution of highly leveraged banks to initially increase. For high
levels of 
 the ￿nancial network becomes sparse: hence the potential for sequential defaults
falls.
Appendix C reports the evolution of the network con￿guration and the Shapley values
for di￿erent values of the risk factors, 1 and 2 : their e￿ects are actually pretty much akin
to the e￿ects observed for di￿erent values of 
:
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Figure 6: Financial System Structures and Capital Requirement Ratio
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are selected ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent liquidity requirements, with all remainder model parameters
kept at their baseline value. In each of those realizations a bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball.
The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all
banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the
arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators.
First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black
line below gives an indication about how much lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the
equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how
much banks have invested on average in non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 7: Systemic Risk and Capital Requirement Ratio
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis on
panels 1 to 15, computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the liquidity requirement ratio, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. The dotted lines are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points
of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E)
ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity
(NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
364.1.1 Risk Charges
In light of the recent debate on the need to introduce taxes on ￿nancial transactions and/or
systemic risk charges we use our network model to analyze the impact of two types of taxes,
respectively on banks’ borrowing and investment in non-liquid assets. Banks’ borrowing
raises the potential for network externalities as exempli￿ed by sequential cascades, invest-
ment in non-liquid assets reduces the scope for liquidity provision and raises the potential
for ￿re-sale externalities. Our analysis is positive in that taxes are not optimal chosen by
an optimal regulator that could internalize both type of externalities, but it does provide a
important feedback on how those taxes can curb the disruptive power of ￿nancial instability.
After including taxes, the banks’ pro￿t function changes as follows:
E(
i) = bl  r
rf +
(ri;nla   2)
p
 nla
i   bb
i 

r
f 
1
1   PDi + 1

; (15)
where 1 is the risk levy for interconnectedness and 2 is the risk levy for derivative
investments.
Figure 8 displays the development of the ￿nancial system along increasing values of both
taxes.
The e￿ects of those taxes on the evolution of the network are fairly intuitive. The
penalty parameter on banks’ borrowing reduces the number of banks leveraging on the
interbank market. The fall in the demand for liquidity reduces the lending rate. The reduced
availability of liquidity reduces the overall amount of non-liquid investment.
More intricate is the interpretation of the behavior of banks featuring di￿erent returns
on non-liquid assets. The penalty parameter on non-liquid assets lowers banks’ yield in
this asset class for all banks: the fraction of banks which then engages in interbank lending
activity increases compared to the case with no levies. As a result overall investment in
non-liquid assets decreases, while the supply of funds on the interbank market increases.
The latter pushes down the interest rate on the interbank market.
Figure 9 displays the e￿ect of the penalty parameters on systemic risk and banks’
37contribution to it.
The taxes reduce both, incentives to borrow and to invest: as a result the interbank
market dries out. Overall results are mixed: the extent of direct inter-connection falls and
so does systemic risk. On the other side the taxes reduce the scope for investment, thereby
a￿ecting adversely the growth prospects of the real side of the economy.
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Figure 8: Financial System Structures and Risk Charges
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent values for systemic risk charges for derivative investments ( 1)
and interbank lendings ( 2), with all remainder model parameters kept at their baseline value. In each of those realizations a bank is represented
by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its
risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A to bank B
shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ equity. Below
each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage of the ￿nancial
system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how much lending a representative arrow
designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank market. Fourth, the
non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how much banks have invested on average in non-liquid assets relative to their
equity.
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Figure 9: Systemic Risk and Risk Charges
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it ((y-axis on panels 1 to 15,
computed following Equation (12))) over a range of increasing values for the penalty parameters for derivatives ( 1) and interbank lendings ( 2)
on the z- and x-axes, respectively.
404.2 Adding Central Bank Intervention
Central banks intervene in the interbank market both as part of the normal activity of their
operational system as well as for unconventional interventions. Both the New York Fed and
the ECB achieve the target policy rate by supplying or withdrawing liquidity from the market
as part of their normal operational procedures. In times of ￿nancial crises and following the
disruption of trust in the interbank market as well as the ensuing liquidity hoarding, central
banks around the globe have taken unconventional measures also with direct borrowing and
lending to individual banks. We therefore want to reconsider the results obtained so far
under the assumption that a central bank intervenes in the interbank market.
The central bank is de￿ned as the nth bank, where n = 15. This bank will neither hold
cash nor non-liquid assets, but will solely supply or demand liquid funds on the interbank
market with the goal of achieving the desired interest rate target. We assume that the central
bank has unlimited funds and thus cannot default.
Prior to any shock central bank interventions can be characterized as follows. If the
target interest rate, rrf is below the equilibrium interest rate on the interbank market 24,
the central bank supplies money until the target is achieved. It demands money in the
opposite case. Following endogenous changes in the ￿nancial system structure (e.g. through
supervisory intervention) the equilibrium interest rate will deviate from the central bank’s
target: in this case the central bank intervenes via supplying/drawing liquidity to/from the
market until the interest rate on the interbank market is within an interval band around its
desired rate (the bands are set to 100 basis points).
The parameters in the baseline setting with central bank are the same as displayed on
Table 2, with the addition, that the target interest rate of the central bank equals 3:59%
which is the equilibrium interest rate in absence of the central bank. Given the interest rate
equilibrium value the bands of the intervention corridor are set to :5 percentages points.
24This corresponds to the equilibrium interest rate obtained in absence of any central bank intervention.
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42Figure 10 outlines the equilibrium ￿nancial system for the baseline scenario. The com-
plete ￿nancial system matrix is outlined on Table 5.
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Figure 10: Financial System in Baseline Scenario With Central Bank Intervention
The ￿gure displays an outline of the ￿nancial system emerging in the baseline setting with central bank intervention. Each bank is represented
by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its
risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A to bank
B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ equity.
Below the stylized ￿nancial system there are four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage of the ￿nancial
system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how much lending a representative arrow
designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank market. Fourth, the
non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how much banks have invested on average in non-liquid assets relative to their
equity.
The considerations done earlier for the case with no central bank interventions are
generally valid here. One noteworthy di￿erence arises: the ￿nancial network linkages are
now much weaker, despite the overall investment in non-liquid assets remains roughly the
same as in absence of interventions.
Figure 12 displays selected ￿nancial networks at di￿erent values of the liquidity require-
43B 1 B 2 B 3 B 4 B 5 B 6 B 7 B 8
0.044 0.002 0.001 0.051 0.045 0.052 0.056 0.043
B 9 B 10 B 11 B 12 B 13 B 14 B 15 SR
0.002 0.003 0.041 0.050 0.002 0.046 0.000 0.438
Table 6: Systemic Risk and Banks’ Contribution in the Baseline Setting
The table displays banks’ contribution to systemic risk, as well as overall systemic risk (SR), in the baseline setting with central bank intervention.
Note that values have been rounded.
ment, . Much of the qualitative developments outlined in absence of central banks remain
valid: few pro￿table banks invest and borrow, while the rest initially engage in bank lending
and then exits the market. As before increasing the liquidity requirement drives up the
interest rate on the interbank market. However, with central bank intervention this e￿ect
only applies within the central bank interest corridor, that is, between 3:09% and 4:09%. If
the interest rate hits the upper boundary of the corridor, the central bank starts supplying
liquidity to prevent the interest rate from increasing further. The central bank supplies much
of the liquidity demanded in the market, hence, contrary to before, a lower fraction of banks
engages in interbank lending and overall investment in non-liquid assets is larger: as the
lending rate is now smaller also the less pro￿table bank tend to invest more in non-liquid
assets.
Figure 12 displays the e￿ect of changes in the liquidity requirement on systemic risk
and banks’ contribution to it. As for the case with no central bank intervention, the pattern
of the non-liquid asset to equity ratio is bell shaped. Now, however the contribution of each
bank to systemic risk is smaller since much of the inter-bank liquidity is provided by the
central bank. This reduces the adverse consequences of default losses.
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Figure 11: Financial System Structures and Liquidity Requirement With Central Bank
Intervention
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent liquidity requirements, with all remainder model parameters kept
at their baseline value. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. In each of those realizations a bank
is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the
sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A
to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’
equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage
of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how much lending a
representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank
market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how much banks have invested on average in non-liquid
assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 12: Systemic Risk and Liquidity Requirement With Central Bank Intervention
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis on
panels 1 to 15, computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the liquidity requirement ratio, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. The dotted lines
are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional
on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to
the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets
held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
46Figure 13 displays selected ￿nancial network con￿gurations at various capital require-
ment ratios, 
. At low levels of 
; pro￿table banks have an incentive to leverage in the
inter-bank market, the more so as with the central bank the lending rate is kept stable at
low levels. The demand for liquidity raises the interbank rate: this triggers an intervention
from the central bank which starts providing liquidity. As the capital requirement increases,
all banks reduce their demand for funds. The interbank rate falls (below the lower bound of
the corridor) and the central bank starts to drain liquidity from the market.
Figure 14 displays systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it when the capital require-
ment ratio increases. Systemic risk decreases because the system develops from a highly
leveraged one to an un-leveraged one as described above.
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Figure 13: Financial System Structures and Capital Requirement Ratio With Central Bank
Intervention
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent capital requirement ratios, with all remainder model parameters
kept at their baseline value. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. In each of those realizations a
bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured
by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from
bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative
to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication about the
percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how much
lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the
interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how much banks have invested on average in
non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 14: Systemic Risk and Capital Requirement Ratio With Central Bank Intervention
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis
on panels 1 to 15, computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the capital requirement ratio, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. The dotted lines
are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional
on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to
the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets
held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
49In presence of a central bank it is also of interest to analyze the impact on the interbank
market of changes in the target rate. Figures 15 displays selected ￿nancial networks under
increasing central bank’s target rates.
The central banks increases the target rate by draining liquidity from the market. The
higher lending rate induces a higher fraction of banks to supply funds in the interbank market
at the expenses of investment in non-liquid assets. Eventually however the reduction in
non-liquid investment and the increase in the lending to equity ratio reduces the equilibrium
lending rate. Figure 16 indeed shows that the loan to equity ratio has a bell-shaped dynamic.
While the loan to asset ratio rises systemic risk and the Shapley values remain high: they
start to decrease when interbank lending falls.
Appendix D shows the e￿ect of changing the risk weights for interbank lending and
investment into non-liquid assets as well as that of ￿nancial levies, all in presence of a
central bank’s interventions.
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Figure 15: Financial System Structures and Central Bank Target Rate
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at interest rate targets for the central bank, with all remainder model parameters
kept at their baseline value. The central bank is by default bank 15. In each of those realizations a bank is represented by a red ball, with the
banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative
to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has
lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized
￿nancial systems there are four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball
designates. Second, the thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how much lending a representative arrow designates relative to
banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity
(NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how much banks have invested on average in non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 16: Systemic Risk and Central Bank Target Rate
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis
on panels 1 to 15, computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the central bank’s target rate, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. The dotted lines
are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional
on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to
the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets
held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
525 Conclusions
One of the major legacies of the recent ￿nancial crisis is the quest for measuring, assessing
and monitoring systemic risk. So far, this task was made di￿cult by the mounting complexity
of the modern ￿nancial systems, all characterized by extensive degrees of interconnections,
and the lack of models apt to perform such tasks. We laid down a dynamic network model
of banks, in which heterogeneity, network externalities and ￿re-sale e￿ects contribute to
propagate ￿nancial shocks through cascades. The model displays a rich pattern for the
dynamic of network con￿guration and the di￿usion of systemic risk, thereby contributing to
the understanding of market mechanism in models with interacting agents. The impact of
prudential regulation on ￿nancial stability and asset investment depends upon a number of
factors, such as asset substitution and market concentration. Note that in most cases there
seems to be a trade-o￿ between curbing the potential for sequential cascades and fostering
banks’ investments in non-liquid assets ￿which can be taken as our models’ proxy for banks’
links with the (exogenous) real economy. Results thus indicate that higher stability might
come at the cost of a lower provision of ￿nancial products and services to the real economy.
Whether this has welfare e￿ects would be interesting to analyze but is beyond the scope of
our current model.
53References
[1] Acemoglu, D., A. Ozdaglarz and A. Tahbaz-Salehi (2013). ￿Systemic Risk and Stability
in Financial Networks.￿ Mimeo.
[2] Adrian, Tobias and Markus Brunnermeier , (2009). ￿CoVaR￿. Mimeo, Princeton Univer-
sity.
[3] Allen, F. and A. Babus (2008). ￿Networks in Finance.￿ Working paper, Wharton Financial
Institutions Center, University of Pennsylvania.
[4] Allen, F. and D. Gale, (2000). ￿Financial Contagion.￿ Journal of Political Economy, 108,
p.1-33.
[5] Allen, F. and D. Gale (2008). ￿Systemic Risk and Regulation￿.
[6] Anand, K., Gai, P. and M. Marsili, (2011). ￿Rollover risk, network structure and systemic
￿nancial crises￿. Forthcoming Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
[7] Atkeson, A.G., A. L. Eisfeldt and P.-O. Weill (2012). ￿Liquidity and Fragility in OTC
Credit Derivatives Markets ￿ Mimeo, University of California Los Angeles.
[8] Baghestanian, S. (2013). ￿Changes in the Market Micro-Structure: Theory and Evi-
dence.￿ Mimeo.
[9] Castro, J., Gomez, D., and Tejadab, J. (2009). ￿Polynomial calculation of the Shapley
value based on sampling.￿ Computers & Operations Research, 36, p.1726-1730.
[10] Billio, M. Getmansky, S., Lo, A. and L. Pelizzon, (2009). ￿Measuring Systemic Risk in
the Finance and Insurance Sectors￿. MIT.
[11] Borio, C., N. Tarashev and K. Tsatsaronis, (2009). ￿The Systemic Importance of Finan-
cial Institutions￿. BIS Quarterly Review.
54[12] Brunner, A. und J. Krahnen, (2008). ￿Multiple lenders and corporate distress: Evidence
on debt restructuring.￿ Review of Economic Studies 75, 2008, S. 415-442.
[13] Caballero, R. and A. Simsek, (2009). ￿Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity￿. Working
paper, MIT.
[14] Cifuentes, R., G. and H. S. Shin (2005). ￿Liquidity Risk and Contagion.￿ Journal of
European Economic Association, 3, p.556-566.
[15] Du￿e, D. and H. Zhu, (2010). ￿Does a central clearing counterparty reduce counterparty
risk?￿. Mimeo.
[16] Eisenberg L. and T. Noe (2001). ￿Systemic Risk in Financial Systems.￿ Management
Science, 47, p.236-249.
[17] Elliot, M., B. Golub and M. Jackson. ￿Financial Networks and Contagion.￿ Mimeo,
California Institute of Technology.
[18] Financial Stability Board and International Monetary Fund and Bank for International
Settlements (2009).￿Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institu-
tions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations￿ Report to the G-20 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors , p.2.
[19] Financial Stability Oversight Council (2010), U.S. Government.
[20] Freixas, X., B. Parigi, and J. C. Rochet (2000). ￿Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations
and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank.￿ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking ,
32, p.611-638.
[21] Gai, P. A. Haldane and S. Kapadia, (2011). ￿Complexity, Concentration and Contagion￿.
Forthcoming Journal of Monetary Economics.
[22] Geanakoplos, J. (2009). ￿The Leverage Cycle.￿ In D. Acemoglu, K. Rogo￿ and M.
Woodford, eds., NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2009, vol. 24: 1-65.
55[23] Grunert, J. and M. Weber (2009).￿Recovery rates of commercial lending: Empirical
evidence for German companies￿ Journal of Banking and Finance , 33, p.505-513.
[24] Gul, F. (1989). ￿Bargaining Foundations of the Shapley Value.￿ Econometrica, 57(1),
81-95.
[25] Jackson, Matthew, (2009). Social Economic Networks. Princeton University Press.
[26] Klein, R., Proctor, S., Boudreault, M., and Turczyn, K. (2002).￿Healthy People 2010
Criteria for Data Suppression￿ Statistical Notes.
[27] Krahnen, J. and M. Bluhm, 2010. ￿Default Risk in an Interconnected Banking System
with Endogenous Asset Markets￿. Frankfurt University.
[28] Laguno￿, R., and L. Schreft (2001). ￿A Model of Financial Fragility.￿ Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 99, p.220-264.
[29] Leitner, Y. (2005). ￿Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Private Sector
Bailouts.￿Journal of Finance, 60(6), p.2925-2953.
[30] Lugovskyy V., D. Puzzello and S. Tucker (2011). ￿An Experimental Study of Bub-
ble Formation in Asset Markets Using the T￿tonnement Trading Institution.￿ Working
Papers in Economics, 11/07, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and
Finance.
[31] Mas-Colell, A. (1986). Notes on price and quantity t￿tonnement. In Models of Economic
Dynamics, edited by H. Sonneschein. Lecture Notes in Mathematical Systems No. 264.
Berlin: Springer- Verlag.
[32] Mas-Colell, A. and M. Whinston. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.
[33] Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole (1996). ￿Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk.￿ Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, 28, p.733-762.
56[34] Shapley, L. (1953). A Value for N-Person Games. Vol. 2: Princeton University Press.
[35] Stanojevic, R., N. Laoutaris and P. Rodriguez (2010). ￿On economic heavy hitters: shap-
ley value analysis of 95th-percentile pricing.￿ Proceedings of the 10th annual conference
on Internet measurement.
57Appendix A: Banks’ Objective Function
Bank i’s expected pro￿t is outlined in Equation (16)
E(
i) = E(
lendingi
) + E(
nlai
)   E(cost
borrowingi
); (16)
where
 E(lendingi) is bank i’s expected pro￿t from lending funds on the interbank market,
 E(nlai) is bank i’s expected pro￿t from investments into non-liquid assets, and
 E(costborrowingi) is bank i’s expected cost for borrowing funds on the interbank market.
Bank i’s expected pro￿t is thus related to two di￿erent asset classes: derivative invest-
ments (non-liquid assets) and interbank lending. Consider ￿rst the interbank market. In
our model the interest rate on the interbank market consists of two components: the ￿rst
component is the risk-free rate, rf, which purely re￿ects the cost of intertemporal transfer
of funds between counterparts, regardless of any insolvency risk. The second component is
a premium, rPD, which re￿ects the probability of default of the borrowing bank. Thus, the
overall cost for bank j to borrow an amount bbj on the interbank market is
E(cost
bbj
) = (r
f + r
PDj
)  bb
j: (17)
To shed more light on the risk premium charged for borrowing money consider banks’
lending decision. Note that lending banks charge a fair risk premium which re￿ects the
counterpart’s actual probability of default. A bank i engaging in interbank lending has the
following expected pro￿t from providing an amount of money, blij, on the interbank market
to bank j:
E(
blij
) = (1   PD
j)  bl
ij  (r
rf + r
PDj
) + PD
j  (bl
ij   bl
ij)  (r
rf + r
PDj
) (18)
58where PD is a bank’s probability of default and , 0    1 is the loss-given-default ratio
which captures that only a fraction of the outstanding amount is paid back in case of the
debtor’s default. The ￿rst product in Equation (18) re￿ects the lender’s pro￿t in case the
debtor does not default, and the second term re￿ects the case when the debtor defaults.
Since creditors charge a fair risk premium for debtors’ probability of default, their ex-
pected pro￿t from lending must be equal to the pro￿t they obtain in the absence of risk,
that is,
E(
blij
) = bl
ij  r
rf: (19)
Replacing E(blij) by blij  rrf in Equation (18) and solving for rPD yields
r
PDj
=
PDj
1   PDj  r
rf (20)
which is the fair premium charged on the interbank market for banks’ individual default
risk.
We assume that banks’ individual probability of default is publicly known. Using Equa-
tions (17) and (20), Bank i’s expected cost of borrowing is thus equal to
E(cost
bbj
) = (r
f + r
PDj
)  bb
j = bb
j  r
f 
1
1   PDj: (21)
Next, bank i’s overall expected pro￿t from lending is given by the sum of individual
amounts lent to its counterparties:
E(
bli
) =
X
1:h2J
E(
blih
); (22)
where  indicates several counterparties, 1 : h 2 J are the h banks bank i has lent money to,
from the set of all banks J not including bank i. Taking the sum over h in Equation (18)
and using Equation (20), it can be shown that Equation (22) simpli￿es to
E(
bli
) = bl  r
rf; (23)
59where bl =
P
1:h2J blih. Equation (23) re￿ects that banks charge fair risk-premia, that is,
in expectation the losses resulting from the default of some counterparties are compensated
by risk premia paid by banks that actually do not default. As a result, the expected yield
from bank lending is equal to the risk free rate.
Finally, bank i’s expected return is also linked to its non-liquid asset investments which is
related to derivative investments. Bank i’s expected return from investments into non-liquid
assets is given by
ri;nla
p
 nla
i; (24)
where ri;nla is bank i’s yield on non-liquid asset investments, nlai is bank i’s investment in
non-liquid assets, and p is the market price of the non-liquid asset. Note that banks’ yield
is divided by the market price of the non-liquid asset ￿which is initially set to 1￿ to re￿ect
that the yield has an inverse relation with the market price. This is the case for ￿nancial
products which feature ￿xed payo￿s such as bonds. Since the market price of non-liquid
assets can change in our model and banks can re-optimize their portfolio, we include this
feature in the objective function.
Using Equations (21), (23), and (24) banks i’s objective function, Equation (16), can
be expressed as
E(
i) = bl  r
rf +
ri;nla
p
 nla
i   bb
i  r
f 
1
1   PDi: (25)
Note that in expectation banks’ return from lending, rf, is smaller than their cost of bor-
rowing, rf  1
1 PDi. This di￿erence emerges because because banks always have to pay a fair
risk premium for borrowing (as long as they do not default) but do not expect to get back
all the funds they lend because in expectation some of their counterpart debtors will default.
In case all borrowing banks’ probability of default is zero, expected borrowing and lending
cost are the same.
60Appendix B: Reliability of Shapley Value Approximation
To assess the reliability of our approximation of the Shapley value, Equation 10, we compute
the relative standard error, based of 100 replications each, over di￿erent sample sizes. The
relative standard error is obtained via dividing the standard deviation of a random variable
by its mean, expressing it as a percentage. Figure 17 displays the relative standard errors
(y-axis) over sample sizes ranging from 10 to 4500 draws (x-axis). The constant solid line
at a relative standard error of 30% is the threshold below which relative standard errors
indicate reliability of estimates, 25 with smaller values indicating higher reliability. The thin
dash-dotted line is the the relative standard error of the ￿nancial institution with the smallest
mean in the sample. The thin dotted line is the average relative standard error of ￿nancial
institutions with sample means in the bottom quartile of all ￿nancial institutions. The solid
medium sized line is the average relative standard error of all ￿nancial institutions. The
thick dotted line is the average relative standard error of ￿nancial institutions with sample
means in the top quartile of all ￿nancial institutions. The thick dash-dotted line is the
relative standard error of the ￿nancial institution with the highest mean in the sample.
The ￿gure indicates three key points. First, when increasing the sample size, the esti-
mates become more reliable. Second, estimates of ￿nancial institutions with a high contri-
bution to systemic risk are more precise relative to institutions with a lower contribution to
systemic risk. Third, from a sample size of 400 draws and larger, all estimates are below the
reliability threshold of a relative standard error of 30%.
25The relative standard error is mainly used in the context of survey analyses where the true population
moments are unknown. See, for example, National Center for Health Statistics [26] for an assessment of the
reliability of relative standard errors below a threshold of 30%.
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Figure 17: Relative Standard Errors at Various Sample Sizes
The ￿gure displays the relative standard errors (y-axis) over sample sizes rangeing from 10 to 4500 draws (x-axis), based on 100 replications each.
The constant solid line at a relative standard error of 30% is the threshold below which relative standard errors indicate reliability of estimates,
with smaller values indicating higher reliability. The thin dash-dotted line is the the relative standard error of the ￿nancial institution with the
smallest mean in the sample. The thin dotted line is the average relative standard error of ￿nancial institutions with sample means in the bottom
quartile of all ￿nancial institutions. The solid medium sized line is the the average relative standard error of all ￿nancial institutions. The thick
dotted line is the average relative standard error of ￿nancial institutions with sample means in the top quartile of all ￿nancial institutions. The
thick dash-dotted line is the the relative standard error of the ￿nancial institution with the highest mean in the sample.
Appendix C. Network Con￿guration and Systemic Risk
for Di￿erent Values of Risk Factors
Figure 18 displays the evolution of the ￿nancial systems at increasing values of the risk
weight on non-liquid assets, 1.
Overall the ￿nancial system becomes less concentrated, interest rates on the interbank
market decrease, the non-liquid-asset-to-equity ratio, which is initially stable, falls beyond a
certain level and interconnectedness in interbank lending decreases.
Figure 19 shows the e￿ect of increasing the risk weight on non-liquid asset investments,
1; on systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it.
As for the case of changes in the capital requirements parameter, 
; here we observe a
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Figure 18: Financial System Structures and Derivative Risk Weights
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent liquidity requirements, with all remainder model parameters kept
at their baseline value. In each of those realizations a bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The
diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all
banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the
arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators.
First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black
line below gives an indication about how much lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the
equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how
much banks have invested on average in non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 19: Systemic Risk and Derivative Risk Weights
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis on
panels 1 to 15, computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the liquidity requirement ratio, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. The dotted lines are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points
of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E)
ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity
(NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
bell-shaped dynamic of systemic risk.
64Figure 20 displays the evolution of the ￿nancial system along increasing values of the
risk weight on interbank lending, 2.
The interbank market interest rate is stable and then increases, the ratio of non-liquid
assets to banks’ equity is ￿rst stable and then decreases, the number of banks engaging in
interbank lending increases.
Figure 21 shows the e￿ect of increasing the risk weight on interbank lending on systemic
risk and banks’ contribution to it.
Increasing the risk weight on interbank lending reduces supply of funds on the interbank
market and thus the interbank interest rate tends to increase: more banks engage in interbank
lending. The increasing level of interconnectedness raises systemic risk. Beyond a certain
value however banks’ lending supply falls and so does systemic risk.
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Figure 20: Financial System Structures and Interbank Lending Risk Weights
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent liquidity requirements, with all remainder model parameters kept
at their baseline value. In each of those realizations a bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The
diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all
banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the
arrow indicating the amount of funds lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators.
First, the red ball gives an indication about the percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black
line below gives an indication about how much lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the
equilibrium interest rate realizing on the interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how
much banks have invested on average in non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 21: Systemic Risk and Interbank Lending Risk Weights
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis on
panels 1 to 15, computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the liquidity requirement ratio, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. The dotted lines are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points
of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E)
ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity
(NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
67Appendix D. Adding Central Bank Intervention
Figure 22 displays selected ￿nancial network con￿gurations at various levels of the risk weight
for non-liquid asset investments, 1.
The interest rate decreases from the upper to the lower bound of the corridor, the
banking system becomes more homogenous in terms of banks’ size, and investments into
non-liquid assets rapidly go down.
Figure 23 displays systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it: increasing the risk weight
results in lower non-liquid asset investment, lower interbank bank, hence lower systemic risk.
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Figure 22: Financial System Structures and Derivative Risk Weights With Central Bank
Intervention
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent risk weights for derivative investments, with all remainder model
parameters kept at their baseline value. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. In each of those
realizations a bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s
size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow
pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds
lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication
about the percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how
much lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the
interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how much banks have invested on average in
non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 23: Systemic Risk and Derivative Risk Weights With Central Bank Intervention
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis on
panels 1 to 15￿ computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the risk weight for derivatives, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. The dotted lines
are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional
on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to
the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets
held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
70Figure 24 displays selected ￿nancial network con￿gurations at various levels of the risk
weight for banks’ interbank lending, 2.
Investments in non-liquid assets remains largely una￿ected in this case, since the interest
rate increase is dampened within the bounds of the corridor.
Figure 25 displays systemic risk and banks contribution to it when the risk weight
on interbank lending is increased. When increasing the risk weight on interbank lending,
systemic risk increases slightly, the loan-to-equity ratio decreases and the non-liquid assets-
to-equity ratio decreases slightly.
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Figure 24: Financial System Structures and Interbank Lending Risk Weights With Central
Bank Intervention
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent risk weights for interbank lendings, with all remainder model
parameters kept at their baseline value. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. In each of those
realizations a bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s
size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow
pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds
lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication
about the percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how
much lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the
interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how much banks have invested on average in
non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 25: Systemic Risk and Interbank Lending Risk Weights With Central Bank Inter-
vention
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, bottom right, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it (y-axis on
panels 1 to 15￿ computed following Equation (12)) as solid lines over di￿erent values of the risk weight for interbank lending, with all other model
parameters kept as in the baseline setting. Note that this set up includes central bank intervention which is by default bank 15. The dotted lines
are the two standard deviation error bands (where thresholds are the 5% cut-o￿ points of the most extreme observations of i obtained conditional
on the shock vectors drawn). On panel 16, the dashed line is the loan-to-equity (L-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all interbank lendings relative to
the sum of all banks’ equity, and the dash-dotted line is the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio, that is, the sum of all non-liquid assets
held by banks relative to the sum of all banks’ equity.
73Figure 26 displays selected ￿nancial network con￿gurations at di￿erent levels of the
levies on non-liquid investment and banks’ borrowing.
As in absence of central bank’s interventions, investments in non-liquid, interbank lend-
ing and the lending rate fall. The ￿nancial system becomes more homogenous with respect
to banks’ size.
Figure 27 displays systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it when changing the ￿nancial
levies. Systemic risk and banks’ contribution to it fall, though the decline is not monotonous
for all banks.
Generally speaking the increase in ￿nancial levies reduces the demand for interbank
liquidity and the lending rate: in presence of central bank’s interventions however the fall
in the lending rate is limited by the lower of the corridor. The direct shock transmission
channel is therefore dampened relative to the case without central bank intervention.
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Figure 26: Financial System Structures and Risk Charges With Central Bank Intervention
The ￿gures displayed on the panel are ￿nancial system realizations at di￿erent values for systemic risk charges for derivative investments ( 1) and
interbank lendings ( 2), with all remainder model parameters kept at their baseline value. The central bank is by default bank 15. In each of those
realizations a bank is represented by a red ball, with the banks’ identi￿ers in the middle of the ball. The diameter of a ball indicates the bank’s
size, measured by the sum of its risk weighted assets relative to the sum of all risk weighted assets of all banks in the ￿nancial system. An arrow
pointing from bank A to bank B shows that bank A has lent money to bank B, with the thickness of the arrow indicating the amount of funds
lent relative to banks’ equity. Below each of the stylized ￿nancial systems there are four further indicators. First, the red ball gives an indication
about the percentage of the ￿nancial system a speci￿c ball designates. Second, the thickness of the black line below gives an indication about how
much lending a representative arrow designates relative to banks’ equity. Third, the interbank rate is the equilibrium interest rate realizing on the
interbank market. Fourth, the non-liquid-assets-to-equity (NLA-E) ratio gives an indication about how much banks have invested on average in
non-liquid assets relative to their equity.
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Figure 27: Systemic Risk and Risk Charges With Central Bank Intervention
The ￿gure displays systemic risk (y-axis on panel 16, computed following Equation (14)) and banks’ contribution to it ((y-axis on panels 1 to 15,
computed following Equation (12))) over a range of increasing values for the penalty parameters for derivatives ( 1) and interbank lendings ( 2)
on the z- and x-axes, respectively. Note that there is central bank intervention which is by default bank 15.
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